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Donald Trump and Trumpism: leadership, ideology and narrative of the business 
executive turned politician 
During the latter stages of the 2016 American election campaign, libertarian 
billionaire Peter Theil claimed that Americans supportive of Donald Trump's 
candidacy–including himself–were taking Trump 'seriously but not literally' (Yarow, 
2016), which implied that those opposed to Trump's candidacy took him literally but 
not seriously. This narrative ambiguity discursively situated Trump as a cipher to 
deeper meaning and a canvas onto which others projected their ambitions for 
America.  Trump's campaign slogan–'Make America Great Again'–was an invocation 
of a nostalgic, imagined, and inherently conservative past, and offered a glimpse of 
the ambitious agenda to re-organize American institutions that lay at its heart. Two 
years on, the evisceration of the Affordable Care Act ("Obamacare"), the passing of 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, the withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Climate 
Accord, the emerging trade war with China, the elevation of conservative jurist Neil 
Gorsuch to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the controversy surrounding 
the candidacy of Brett Kavanaugh to the same body, are the most well-known 
examples of this ambition ( Béland, Rocco, and Waddan, 2018; Chang, 2018; Noland, 
2018; Urpelainen and Van de Graaf, 2018).  It is now indisputable that Trump needs 
to be taken seriously.  
Researchers are also now seeking to understand Trumpism as an emerging ideology 
(Blyth, 2016).  Here we draw upon Van Dijk’s definition of ideology as ‘a form of 
social cognition shared by the members of a group’, a ‘cognitive framework’ which 
‘assigns coherence among social attitudes which in turn codetermine social practice’ 
and which ‘embod[ies] an interest-dependent (re)construction of social reality’ (Van 
Dijk, 2008: 34-35). Our contribution in this article is to explore how Trumpism is a 
syncretic amalgam of a particular narrative of Trump’s business career and an 
articulation of right-wing populist rhetoric mixed with previously fringe conservative 
philosophies. We argue that management and organization studies, bringing an 
understanding and critique of leadership, institutional change, power, resistance and 
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inequalities (Bristow and Robinson, 2018; De Cleen et al., 2018), is well placed to 
conceptualize Trumpism as it has blended discursive structures and narratives of 
leadership from both business and politics, and can be analysed drawing from both 
fields of study. Further, for management and organization studies scholars, it is 
necessary to understand how Trump’s particular understanding of business, leadership 
and success have so quickly become embedded in the organization of government and 
are being used as a lever for substantial institutional change.  
The article is organized as follows. The first section provides an outline of Trump’s 
business career and identifies the key narrative themes used to articulate Trumpism 
and Trump as politician.  Personal stories of a candidate's life are a feature of 
American presidential campaigns (Barra, 2017; Burns, 2006). They are used to 
establish credibility, legitimacy, and a narrative for the suitability of the candidate and 
their ability to embody and implement an approach to policy when in office. These 
stories form discourses that 'co-create the context to which they and others must 
respond' (Fairhurst, 2009: 1608).  
The second section brings together Trump (his career history and identity) and the 
ideology of Trumpism to understand the marketing of Trump as candidate and 
president. Here we discuss the importance of Steve Bannon as he understood how 
these two facets could be packaged in a populist rhetoric that would appeal to a large 
section of the electorate (Green, 2017). This marketing appeal built on Trump’s prior 
celebrity, in particular his starring role in the reality TV programme, The Apprentice.  
His regular and long-lasting media profile facilitated the demonstration of his 
supposed leadership style and familiarized the public with his rhetorical strategies. 
This has been described as a right-wing mediatized spectacle (Hall, Goldstein and 
Ingram, 2016). 
This paper explores in more detail Trump’s business career and its constructed 
narrative and, then, how this narrative is used, along with right-wing populist ideas, to 
construct Trump as a viable leader and Trumpism as an emerging ideology. In this 
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special paper series Spector and Wilson (2018),  argue that Trump demands that we 
think differently about leadership as he exemplifies the problems of the dominant 
discourse of transformational leadership and the ways in which it can overlap with 
demagogic leadership. Similar to understandings of transformational leadership, 
Trump utilised a particular reading of his business career to present himself as the 
heroic and exceptional leader–a ‘personification of American ‘greatness’’ (Spector 
and Wilson, 2018: 789). We understand leadership here from a discursive perspective 
where Trump’s identity as leader is co-constructed by Trump, senior advisors such as 
Steve Bannon and, importantly, by commentators and the public who envision Trump, 
whether reasonably or not, within a particular framing. Goethals (2017), following the 
work of Gardener (1995), argues that 'leaders influence followers through stories, 
particularly their stories about a group's identity, and that her or his story competes 
with "counterstories"’ (Goethals, 2017: 418). Our argument is that Trump was able to 
use his own narrative of business success to appeal to his electoral base. As leadership 
is constructed through legitimating narratives (Fairhurst, 2009; Goethals, 2017; 
Spector and Wilson, 2018),  Tourish (2019) further argues that as leadership is 
communicatively co-constructed, the leader and follower identities are unstable and 
evolving. Within the context of populist personalistic leadership this is particularly 
precarious, unpredictable and shifting because of the emphasis on a charismatic 
character and support from followers as opposed to a coherent ideology or 
embeddness in established institutions (Weyland, 2017). Thus, as the second section 
of this paper argues, Trump must utilise both traditional and social media in order to 
maintain his leadership via direct communication with his followers in order to 
sustain the constructed identities and create a semblance of cohesion to the ideology. 
Part 1: Trump–a stylized business/career history 
In the analysis below we provide a brief account of Trump's business/career. It is 
necessarily stylized and partial. It is based on a critical reading of three main 
biographies ( D’Antonio, 2016; Johnston, 2016; Kranish and Fisher, 2016) as well as 
additional news sources. This approach is what Fischer (Fischer, 1997: 18) calls 
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'constructed evidence', selected  'specifically to address a question', in this case how 
Trump's history reflects his approach to politics, and how this narratively fits into 
Trump's alignment with the emerging ideology to which his name is associated.  
Trump's career can be divided into three phases. The first, lasting from the early 
1970s until the mid/late-1980s was as a real estate entrepreneur, focusing mainly on 
New York and Atlantic City. The second was from the late 1980s. Following financial 
distress, banks bailed out Trump, and his control over his business was heavily 
mediated by the influence of financial institutions. Then, third, from the late 1990s 
onwards, Trump's fortunes were transformed by his emergence as a reality TV 
celebrity and the development of the Trump brand. We argue that Trump based his 
business 'success' on seeking preferential advantages, tax breaks, bailouts, value 
extraction, and risk transference, often seeing value in economic decay, and holding a 
zero-sum or even negative-sum view of economic transactions.  
The formative experience of Trump's business career was in New York in the late 
1970s.  Amid substantial economic decline (Tabb, 1982) and desperate for urban 
renewal, the city was prepared to offer developers tax deals and subsidies, something 
Trump exploited. The first major project in this period was to redevelop the faded 
Commodore hotel, an asset of the bankrupt Penn Central Railroad. To do this Trump 
needed tax breaks, capital, and a management company to run the hotel: 
Trump played the city, the sellers, and the hotel chain off one another, using one 
to leverage a deal with the other. He assured Penn Central's negotiators that he 
had a solid deal with Hyatt when he had no such thing, and the railroad gave 
him a nonbinding, exclusive opportunity to buy the $10 million property 
(Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 75). 
Another key event in this early period was a Justice Department suit against the 
Trumps for racial bias in the selection of tenants for housing they owned (Kranish and 
Fisher, 2016: 63). Though the case was 'a complete loss for Trump' (Johnston, 2016: 
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39) and found in favour of the Justice Department, Trump nonetheless presented the 
outcome as a win, claiming variously that the 'government couldn't prove its case' and 
that in settling he had made 'no admission of anything’ (Johnston, 2016: 39; Kranish 
and Fisher, 2016: 68). The case gave a foretaste of three classic Trump stratagems: 
aggressive counter-attacking; a tactical withdrawal and settlement; and media spin, 
regardless of the real outcome.  
Trump's attraction to the opportunities offered by economic decay are also seen in the 
acquisition of casinos in the run-down coastal resort of Atlantic City in the 1980s. 
Once acquired, Trump redeveloped his casinos in a lavish way by loading them with 
high interest debt. This proved unsustainable as the casinos were not profitable 
enough. Combined with financial overextension elsewhere, by 1990 Trump reportedly 
owed $3.2 billion, two thirds to Wall Street banks (Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 193). 
The banks negotiated together to attempt to avoid a cascade of defaults by Trump 
(Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 193), while 'Trump kept reminding them that, unless they 
gave him relief, they would all suffer together’ (Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 195). The 
deal that they eventually enforced restructured Trump's vast debt, including deferred 
interest payment on $1 billion in loans. The cost to Trump was that many of his assets 
were either sold or placed under lien to the bankers (Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 195–
96). But Trump survived and remained involved in the management of the assets 
because his name was considered essential to their ongoing viability (Johnston, 2016: 
93). 
In 1995 Trump formed a publicly traded company to buy the Trump Plaza Hotel and 
Casino. The capital raised from shareholders was used to buy Trump's two other 
distressed casinos, appropriating both the assets and their debt. Trump pocketed 
$880,000 for arranging the deal, in which he was in reality both the buyer and the 
seller. Between 1995 and 2009 as variously CEO and Chairman of the new firm, 
Trump was paid $44 million, while at the same time the firm bought huge volumes of 
Trump branded merchandise–from Trump (Buettner and Bagli, 2016; Kranish and 
Fisher, 2016: 208).  
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As the company struggled to service its debt, the share price fell from a peak of $35 
dollars to less than $1 dollar (Buettner and Bagli, 2016). As Kranish and Fisher 
observe, '[w]hile Trump was Chairman, the company lost more than $1 billion and 
was in the red every year between 1995 and 2005’ (Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 207) 
and that '[h]olders of the company's stocks and bonds lost more than $1.5 billion 
during Trump's management’ (Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 207–8). The firm entered 
bankruptcy in 2004, and despite that Trump remained as Chairman when it exited 
bankruptcy, after a re-organization where the shareholders and bondholders took the 
main haircut (Buettner and Bagli, 2016; Kranish and Fisher, 2016, 208). Along with 
other notable failures  there is little to suggest that Trump's record in business was 1
anything other than decidedly mixed.  
Trump's fortunes improved in the 2000s in great part due to The Apprentice TV series.  
There is no doubt at all that this was a considerable success, cementing the public 
image of Trump as a rich and decisive business leader (Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 
210–39).  The struggles of the 1990s had led to an effective consolidation of Trump's 
business interests. The core of Trump's empire are fifteen properties in Manhattan 
(Bagli, 2016), where he owns either the entirety of the properties, or has long-term 
leases which amount to the same, or has substantial co-ownership (Tully, 2016). 
The global expansion of the Trump brand since the early 2000s has been remarkable.  
According to newspaper reports, Trump owns or controls over 500 assets in over 
twenty countries across the World (Helderman and Hamburger, 2015; Time-Staff, 
2017). However, in many instances this is via a licensing arrangement, with the levels 
of equity holdings opaque and potentially non-existent.  Such arrangements are 
present in a number of developments, including in Canada, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, the UAE and Uruguay (Time-Staff, 2017).  
Similarly, Trump's activities 'have expanded well beyond real estate into the realm of 
branded developments and brand marketing ... the Trump name has been deployed in 
recent years to market not only high-end development projects but also a range of 
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consumer goods from mattresses to menswear, from water to wine’ (Helderman and 
Hamburger, 2015). As Trump himself stated, '[t]he image I created through the media 
enabled me to build one of the greatest luxury brands in the world’ (Trump, 2015: 12). 
While Trump has taken credit for this, and has financially benefitted from the 
licensing levies, it has also enabled him to walk away from failing enterprises without 
any personal or organizational liability (Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 224). This in part 
explains how Trump was able to survive the Global Financial Crisis, the greatest 
downturn in the American real estate market since the Great Depression. Though 
several Trump branded real estate projects went bust in this period, Trump hadn't 
personally invested in them (for example, in the failed Trump Towers project in 
Atlanta, or the Trump Ocean Resort in Baja, Mexico) (Johnston, 2016: 169–78; 
Kranish and Fisher, 2016: 228).  
Across his career it is estimated that Trump benefitted from tax breaks worth at least 
$885 million in New York City alone (Bagli, 2016), and in other respects Trump has 
benefitted from state largesse in many of the deals he has made. It has recently been 
suggested by the New York Times that Trump's tax planning may have stretched what 
was legal, something that Trump's representatives deny (Barstow, Craig, and Buettner, 
2018). Over the years Trump has been heavily involved in hundreds of litigations and 
has used the law to pursue his commercial agenda, often overwhelming his opponents 
through a combination of aggression, attrition, and deep pockets (D’Antonio, 2016; 
Johnston, 2016; Kranish and Fisher, 2016). When Trump suffered failure or loss, he 
would claim victory, and has proved to be an adept media operator. His ex-post 
renegotiation of both debt and commercial deals represents a very different 
understanding to the supposition of mutual benefit that underpins liberal (and even 
libertarian) conceptions of market capitalism.  
What provides conceptual unity to these themes in Trump's career is a zero-sum (or 
even negative sum) approach to organizational and business relationships.  This 
perspective may well have its roots in the nature of real estate transactions which–
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unlike the production of goods and services–add little on-going economic value after 
the initial deal, and instead merely provide a mechanism to collect economic rents. In 
the 1980s Tony Schwartz ghost-wrote The Art of the Deal for Trump (Trump and 
Schwartz, 1987). He later commented that: 
To survive, I concluded from our conversations, Trump felt compelled to go to 
war with the world. It was a binary, zero-sum choice for him: You either 
dominated or you submitted. You either created and exploited fear, or you 
succumbed to it (Schwartz, 2017). 
This zero-sum world-view held by Trump is therefore both long-lasting and deep. 
This perspective–in evidence throughout his business career–also helps explain his 
approach to politics, such as his protectionist instincts on trade, and his consistent and 
long-held belief that international allies such as Japan (and more recently South 
Korea) 'had been "taking advantage" of US military protection’ (Kranish and Fisher, 
2016: 191). During the 2016 Presidential campaign Trump developed a consistent and 
electorally compelling critique of contemporary America that was 'losing': 
We lose to China. We lose to Mexico both in trade and at the border. We lose to 
Russia and Iran and Saudi Arabia (Trump, 2015: 9). 
In juxtaposition, Trump drew on a highly selective historical account of his own 
business career and leadership ability: 
I realized that with my well-known success story and record of building 
residential and office buildings and developing public spaces–all while 
accumulating personal wealth–I could inspire people to help create the most 
massive turnaround in American history (Trump, 2015: 4). 
... 
I'm not bragging when I say that I am a winner. I have experience in winning. 
That's what we call leadership (Trump, 2015: 9). 
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This narrative was one of American decline against which Trump had been 
successful–through his expertise in turnaround and having the right leadership skills. 
Trump’s own articulation of his business career situated him as uniquely experienced 
even while lacking a traditional political track record. Thus, his narrated leadership 
mythos becomes an enabling 'Discourse-cum-repertoire’ (Fairhurst, 2009: 1619) that 
allows Trump to been seen by some as the embodiment of necessary change. This 
particularly appealed to those Americans who felt that they were not receiving what 
they deserved (Hochschild, 2016). This ‘psychology of relative deprivation’ is 
connected to Trump’s leadership by Goethals who argues that this was used to 
motivate Trump's supporter base by appealing to their ‘self-enhancing self-
evaluations’ (Goethals, 2018: 3) where Trump would praise a group of potential 
supporters (like white-working class voters without a college degree or police 
officers) and then criticise another group claiming that they were taking from or 
benefitting off the first group (Goethals, 2017). Trump combined this ‘relative 
deprivation’ with his ‘zero-sum’ worldview to present himself as the leader best 
positioned to correct this ‘inbalance’. Put more simply, Trump could address his 
base's perception of inequality, perception of  economic decline, and get them a better 
deal–even if the reality of Trump's economic policies is contrary to the rhetoric.  
Understanding further how these attributes made Trump into the figure-head of a 
political movement requires us now to examine the ideological context of right-wing 
thought in America and his particular populist celebrity appeal. 
Part 2: The populist appeal of Trumpism 
Wodak identifies three characteristics of a successful right-wing populist movement: 
(1) the invocation of a national 'heartland' (or 'homeland'); (2) the identification of a 
'pure' community associated with the heartland who are situated antagonistically to 
'others' not from the heartland, often immigrants; and (3) a 'distancing dynamic' which 
'sustains an antagonistic relationship between "the people", "the elites" and "the 
(dangerous) others"’ (Wodak 2015, 26). Similarly, Engesser et al. outline five features 
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of populism as ‘sovereignty of the people, advocating for the people, attacking the 
elite, ostracizing others, and invoking the ‘heartland’ (2017: 1109). All of these are 
present in Trump's campaign and presidency. It seems incongruous that a professed 
billionaire would be able to motivate support with this rhetoric (though others, such as 
Sivio Berlusconi in Italy, have done something similar). We argue that it is Trump’s 
business background as outlined above along with drawing upon previously fringe 
views from the far-right that created a semblance of narrative consistency in the 
positioning of Trump as the kind of businessman within a particular historical period 
in the United States who could fulfil these right-wing populist aspirations. 
Before Trump, the Tea Party mobilized support with a similar rhetoric within which 
anger, rather than fear, was the emotional key (Smith and Hanley, 2018: 13). Wahl-
Jorgensen has described this rhetoric as ‘angry populism’ (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2018: 
766). The mobilization of this anger in Trumpian populism is connected ideologically 
to the bringing into mainstream discourse ideas which had recently been considered 
on the fringe. Further, it is the success of the Tea Party in moving Republicans to the 
right that has opened up connections with the far-right (rebranded as ‘Alt-right’).  
A leading advocate of a repetitious hostility to migrants, foreigners and elites in the 
Trump campaign was Steve Bannon, who briefly served Trump after the election as 
Chief Strategist in the White House, and it is he who instrumentalized a means for 
Trump to appeal to large numbers of Americans. Bannon is enigmatic, holding a 
world-view that can simultaneously draw on racist tropes (for example his repeated 
citation of The Camp of the Saints, an obscure and extremely racist 1973 novel that 
describes how Europe becomes over-run with non-white immigrants (Blumenthal and 
Rieger 2017a; Blumenthal and Rieger 2017b)), while also being critical of the white 
supremacist leaders of the Alt-right. While Bannon denies that he is himself a white 
supremacist, he appears to hold a highly antagonistic view of a "clash of civilizations" 
where immigration is weakening a Judeo-Christian West (Blumenthal and Rieger 
2017b).   
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Bannon is also an enthusiast for the pseudo-historical and pseudo-scientific "Strauss-
Howe generational theory" (Howe 2017) which interprets American history through a 
succession of 'generations’ and makes predictions for the future unfolding of 
American history, including what they describe as 'the crisis of 2020'. This crisis 
(which might come before or after 2020) is conceived of as a severe social cataclysm 
that will be the 'pivotal moment' for all the different generations alive at that time: 
The Crisis of 2020 will be a major turning point in American history and an 
adrenaline-filled moment of trial... Sacrifices will be asked and will be given. 
America will be implacably resolved to do what needs doing, and fix what 
needs fixing (W. Strauss and Howe 1991: 382). 
For Bannon this imagined future crisis is both existential and essentialist. At a 
Republican conference in 2011 he stated that 
[S]omewhere over the next 10 or 20 years, we’re going to come through this 
crisis, and we’re either going to be the country that was bequeathed to us or it’s 
going to be something that’s completely or totally different. ... [the] Judeo-
Christian West is collapsing ... it’s imploding on our watch. And the blowback 
of that is going to be tremendous (Blumenthal and Rieger, 2017a). 
In an interview with the New York Times in 2017 Bannon claimed that '[e]verything 
President Trump is doing — all of it — is to get ahead of or stop any potential 
crisis’ (Peters, 2017). Bannon's essentialism and desire to reassert what he considers 
to be traditional American values aligns closely with those people in the US that 
Wodak describes likely to be receptive to right-wing populism–the supposed 'losers' 
of modernization (whether real or imagined) (Wodak, 2015: 26). So, while Bannon 
and others imagine a crisis based on long-run historical trends, political principle, and 
some sense of American destiny (all of which have been deployed narratively by the 
Trump camp to garner support), there has also been a real crisis in the 'rust-belt' 
'heartland' of middle America, within which these narratives have resonance. While 
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Clinton did better than Trump amongst low-income voters, Trump won in poorer 
areas of the country (Bump, 2017). 
A key element of this are the ways in which economic development, globalization, 
and neo-liberal market reforms have caused substantial socio-economic dislocation.  
Mark Blyth's paper on "Global Trumpism" makes the point that neo-liberal reforms 
from the late 1970s onwards have led to falling real wages and rising personal and 
household debt. In this context, the gatekeepers of neo-liberalism (the Davos-class 
and the establishment Republicans and Democrats) are the beneficiaries of a regime 
based on anti-inflationary policies that have systematically undermined large sections 
of American society. As Blyth argues 'the debtors can't pay–but politically, and this is 
crucial–it empowers debtors since they can't pay, won't pay, and still have the right to 
vote’ (Blyth, 2016). As Trump said 'I am the king of debt. I love debt' (Egan, 2016), 
with reference to his renegotiation of the terms of loans, and the frequent haircuts 
taken by lenders where he was concerned. This self-acclaimed mastery of an 
impersonal source, even cause, of widespread economic hardship–founded on 
Trump's business experience–is a further reason why Trump appeals to those who 
have endured that hardship (or perceive that they have)–that narratively, he stands up 
to and bests the impersonal forces that have caused individual destitution.  
This narrative also builds a kind of solidarity between those who have endured 
hardship, those who believe they have endured, and those for whom the hardship of 
others – perhaps especially in their communities – fits into a world-view of the 
material and political decline of ‘traditional’ white America. Trump’s success in the 
2016 election and his continued support among his voter base is not straightforwardly 
connected to economic well-being or perceptions of economic well-being. Between 
the 2012 and 2016 elections economic anxiety amongst white voters actually declined 
(McElwee and McDaniel, 2017). In 2016, economic anxiety among non-white voters 
was greater than for white voters but this group did not predominately vote for Trump 
(McElwee and McDaniel, 2017). It therefore remains an open question as to how 
Trump was able to benefit from a narrative of economic hardship. 
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Hochschild’s Strangers in their own land (Hochschild, 2016) sketches how there is a 
'deep story' of resentment in communities that have not fared well in the last few 
decades, which has led them to feel they are the figurative 'strangers' of the title. This 
deep story involves notions of 'doing the right thing', working hard, of sacrifice and of 
being authentic Americans on the one hand, and in contrast–on the other–of waiting 
patiently in line while 'line cutters' (immigrants, refugees, minorities, women) 'cut 
ahead' by being given advantages and resources by the government. This resentment 
is also fuelled by notions that 'elites' patronize them and have shaped a narrative 
where sympathy must be felt towards the groups that the (usually left) elites have 
defined as oppressed.  Trump's antipathy to 'political correctness' and the institutions 
of government which promote ‘line cutting’, and antipathy to those parts of the 
government which are seen as limiting growth or taking away jobs (particularly 
relating to environmental protection) create in those supporters of Trump a kind of 
cathartic 'elation' (Hochschild, 2016: 228) that, at last, someone understands the 
position that white America finds itself in.  
Smith and Hanley concluded that Trump’s supporters voted for him more because 
they shared his prejudices rather than because of actual financial strain and it was 
Trump’s credibility, in their eyes, as a ‘domineering leader who insults and thwarts 
‘line-cutter’ that determined their loyalty’ (Smith and Hanley, 2018: 13). Trump 
performs then a role as both critic of institutions, and a saviour of sorts where his 
business acumen will provide the salve. In an un-ironic echo of Gordon Gekko , at a 2
rally Trump is reported (by Hochschild, 2016: 244) as saying: 
I've been greedy. I'm a businessman ... take, take, take. Now I'm going to be 
greedy for the United States (wild cheers).  
The racist element of the rise of support for Trump is connected by Narayan to the 
decline in the 'wages of whiteness', or the historically situated benefit of being white 
in a global economy that had benefitted substantially from imperialism (Narayan, 
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2017) and, by implication, from slavery (Kendi, 2016; Roediger, 1999). The 
breakdown of this settlement has had the effect of racializing the political discourse of 
that decline, but also of shattering support for the neo-liberal plutocracy at the heart of 
American polity in the last thirty years (Narayan, 2017).  
The documentary film-maker Michael Moore has commented that '[p]eople are upset. 
They're angry at the system and they see Trump — not so much that they agree with 
him — but they see him as the human Molotov cocktail that they get to toss into the 
system with Brexit and blow it up, send a message' (Wang, 2016). For those who feel 
they have already 'lost', the prospect of 'winning', of disruption, and radical re-
organization becomes a more than symbolic act, it becomes a way of simultaneously 
holding contradictory positions and doing something about both. These zero-sum or 
negative-sum world-views allow both angry destructive impulses and aspiration (for 
me to win, others must lose; or, if I must lose, everyone should lose), of looking to an 
imaginary past as a guide to a nostalgic future (as much about Trump's supposed 
business acumen, as about the prosperity of the past and who benefitted from it), of 
seeking to re-organize and change the institutions of the Republic in order to save it.    
Trump’s pre-existing celebrity status was crucial to the feasibility of creating a 
convincing narrative of Trump as leader within this combination of far-right 
ideologies, right-wing populist rhetoric and business experience. Street (2018) argues 
that it is not sufficient to merely see Trump as a celebrity politician.  Rather, it is 
necessary to focus on how Trump was not just well known, but known for ‘doing 
particular things’ (Street, 2018: 5). Gabriel et al. (2018) concluded that those who 
watched The Apprentice/Celebrity Apprentice had a stronger ‘parasocial’ bond with 
Trump and that this was the case regardless of whether or not they identified as a 
Republican. The character of Trump in these programmes with which they formed a 
bond was presented as already having the qualities of leadership necessary for the 
presidency. His presentation was ‘decidedly presidential-he alone made the decisions 
about who would stay or go, his decisions were always right within the narrative of 
the show, and he was able to make the decision fairly and quickly’ (Gabriel et al, 
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2018: 305). Trump was a familiar and popular face for decades before becoming a 
political candidate. He carried his pre-existing media personae into his right-wing 
populist rhetoric. His performances were compelling both to those who supported and 
opposed his candidacy and, further, Hall et al. (2017) credit his success to the extent 
that he was ‘entertaining’. His spectacular performances such as his ‘gestural 
enactments’ (mocking a disabled journalist, for example) produced the ‘comedic 
callousness that is central to his political persona’ (Hall et al., 2017: 89).  
Trump’s celebrity identity and persona were further extended through his use of social 
media. Again, Trump’s celebrity identity established through years in the public eye 
were combined with an understanding of how social media was a particularly 
effective medium for right-wing populist rhetoric. Gerbaudo (2018) describes how 
social media enables these movements to ‘rally anger’ against the mainstream media 
and that the algorithmic architecture of social media has enabled ‘disgruntled 
individuals’ to ‘form online crowds’ (Gerbaudo, 2018: 746).  Engesser et al. (2017) 
similarly add that the populism spread via social media is fragmented and that it is 
often strategically ‘ambiguous and malleable’ (Gerbaudo, 2018: 1122) which also 
serves as an apt description of Trump’s social media messages.  
Thus, Trump entered politics with a pre-existing celebrity persona with which many 
of the public had already formed a positive bond. Trump as business leader, celebrity, 
and entertainer, provided a vehicle for otherwise non-mainstream views to be 
presented as accessible, acceptable, and familiar. A particular reading of his business 
career through the positive framing via The Apprentice positioned Trump as a credible 
and therefore viable national leader. This vision of Trump as a leader was particularly 
well suited to the social media that he embraced, and through this medium he 
legitimated, or liberated, sentiments and resentments previously understood as 
inappropriate in public discourse.  
It is this combination of factors, along with a number of other external circumstances 
and influences, which, we argue, facilitated Trump’s electoral success. These factors 
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are very much about the cultivation of an image and a particular framing of his 
identity - utilizing various forms of media - as legitimate and competent. We are not 
arguing here that he is competent nor that his business background actually makes 
him well suited for the role of president. We do argue that he is an effective political 
communicator, even if his style repulses many. He and his advisors have been able to 
articulate a message and galvanise support. Trump is both a symptom and a cause, he 
is the logical outcome of a long process, such as the growth of the Tea Party which we 
outline above, and his success is a reflection of deep resentment. He has ridden these 
sentiments to success. His administration, and his rhetoric, are also further fanning the 
flames of this resentment.  
Within this special paper series  Gills et al. (2018) describe the Trump presidency as 
‘status dysfunction’ outlining the forms of organizational dysfunction within his 
administration including the poor qualifications of his appointees and the large 
number of empty positions. Further, they observe that while he has presented himself 
as ‘deal maker’ he has been incompetent in this respect. As we have argued above, 
Trump’s overstating of his business acumen is long-standing. However, it is unclear 
the extent to which this dysfunction is unintentional. Recently, an Interior Department 
official, speaking to oil exploration companies, praised Trump’s ability to distract the 
media and the public while actual work was quietly done in the background (Tobias, 
2019). Further, the unfilled positions are a component of a plan for further shrinking 
the federal government. For many in the administration the longest federal shutdown 
in history was not symptomatic of Trump’s inability to properly govern but, rather, a 
‘means to an end’ to limit the size and scope of the federal government by 
highlighting the limited services that were, in their eyes, truly essential and if 
frustrated federal workers quit and others increasingly avoided applying for federal 
positions because of the increasing precarity of previously stable positions, all the 
better (Rein et al., 2019). It is difficult to use established metrics and expectations to 
evaluate this administration where it is unclear whether the dysfunction and chaos are 
intentional or not. The ambiguity of the immigration ban in 2017 which resulted in 
chaos and protests at airports was intentional. Steve Bannon and executive advisor, 
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Stephen Miller, consciously sought to foment protests to further inflame the situation 
(Coppins, 2018). There is a need to consider how to evaluate an administration which, 
on the one hand, is clearly dysfunctional and inept, but, on the other hand, appears to, 
at times, use trolling as a strategy of governing. 
Conclusion 
In this article we have presented a critique of Donald Trump and the emerging 
ideology known as Trumpism by drawing on perspectives from critical management / 
organization studies and related fields such as business history and leadership studies. 
It is impossible to understand the contemporary American political landscape without 
thinking critically about Trump's business career, his leadership style, how he has 
been marketed to the American public, and how his approach to business is informing 
the conservative political agenda that his administration is pursuing. We have sought 
to demonstrate how American politics has been shaped by the intertwining of Trump's 
approach to business and leadership with narratives of American decline in 
combination with a populist rhetoric that appeals to voters who feel left behind–even 
if the reality is, in some cases, rather different.  
Throughout the Trumpian political project there is a resonance, and rhetorical 
emphasis, on decline and decay, impending crisis, and a zero-sum (or negative-sum) 
understanding of economic and social issues. Conservative ideologies hitherto 
marginal to the mainstream of the American right have been legitimated–in great part 
via Trump's 'business' celebrity. They are used to justify Trump’s ruthless and selfish 
approach to business and politics (zero/negative-sum, debt manipulation is good, shift 
risk, and refuse to concede defeat), and as the inspiration for radical and in many 
cases disturbing political change. The aspects of Trump’s business identity that might 
be assumed to deter voters are precisely the features that entice them. When wrapped 
up in a rhetoric of ‘Making America Great Again’, Trump promises an ethno-
nationalist (Edwards, 2009) economic transformation to those feeling in a state of 
decline. We have argued that at the core of President Trump's attractiveness as a 
candidate in the 2016 Presidential election (and his on-going support among his 
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political base) are his claims to business acumen, his status as an outsider, his ability 
to disrupt established power structures, and his critique of contemporary America. Of 
critical importance here is that Trump provides and represents a considerable body of 
opinion that America is dis-organized and mis-managed, and that the cure or solution 
is Trump-ish business leadership in office. As Gould, Bourk and Joullié observe, 
Trump’s appeal is that ‘no one had hitherto juxtaposed the conniving and often 
duplicitous ways of the business manager with those of the inept politician or state 
official’ (Gould, Bourk, and Joullie, 2017: 487). 
As we have argued above, Trump’s leadership is discursively co-constructed. The 
concern here is how effectively this constructed narrative has worked to legitimate not 
only Trump, but also alt-right ideas embedded in this discourse. 
What makes Trump a credible vehicle for these trends is that he fits the narratives 
shaped by the likes of Steve Bannon–of the revolutionary leader who has come to 
save a nation, and his business career represents (or can be made to represent) a set of 
leadership traits and cognitive scripts that seem to contrast with the business 
orthodoxy of neo-liberal conceptions of success: Trump speaks out against trade deals 
that lead to the flight of jobs overseas. Trump 'loves debt' and making creditors take a 
haircut; increasing household debt maps to perceptions of national indebtedness and 
decline. Trump makes money out of decline and decay; he survives against the odds 
when the 'chips' are down and as a real estate mogul, he managed to make money 
through the greatest real estate crisis since the Great Depression, which as a national 
event had scarring effect on perceptions of prosperity and opportunity. Trump's 
monarchical business leadership style suits those who would break the hold of a 
faceless plutocratic class in Washington. Amongst a certain group of Americans who 
feel that the promise of America has been denied to them, he represents winning, or at 
least its possibility. The extent to which this narrative is real or imagined matters far 
less than the Presidency that it has created, and the transformations–political, cultural, 
social, economic–that are occurring in its wake. 
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